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Abstract 
 Prosocial decisions may lead to unequal payoffs among group members. 
Although an aversion to inequity has been found in empirical studies of both human and 
nonhuman primates, the contexts previously studied typically do not involve a trade-off 
between pro-sociality and inequity. Here we investigate the apparent co-existence of 
these two factors, specifically the competing demands of prosociality and equity.  We 
directly compare the responses of brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) among 
situations where pro-social preferences conflict with equality, using a paradigm 
comparable to other studies of cooperation and inequity in this species.  By choosing to 
pull a tray towards themselves, subjects rewarded themselves and/or another in 
conditions in which the partner either received the same or different rewards, or the 
subject received no reward.  In unequal payoff conditions, subjects could obtain equality 
by choosing not to pull in the tray, so that neither individual was rewarded.  The monkeys 
showed prosocial preferences even in situations of moderate disadvantageous inequity, 
preferring to pull in the tray more often when a partner was present than absent.  
However when the discrepancy between rewards increased, prosocial behavior ceased.  
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Introduction 
 Prosocial preferences have recently gained status as a potential motivational 
mechanism underlying complex cooperation in human societies, and the long-term 
mutual benefits associated with it (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003).  However, this motivation 
may result in actions that produce inequity between the performer and recipient 
(Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Fehr, et al. 2006; Xiao and Bicchieri, forthcoming), so 
how does it overcome aversion for inequity (Dawes, Fowler, Johnson, McElreath, & 
Smirnov, 2007; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999)? In natural environments, it is hard to maintain 
perfect equity in every interaction, making prosocial behavior hard to maintain without 
some degree of inequality tolerance.  Indeed, the evolution of human society and 
economic growth are often accompanied by inequality (Aghion, Caroli, & Garcia-
Penalosaand, 1999), leaving open the possibility that prosocial impulses must entail 
inequity tolerance if they are to result in extensive cooperation.   
 Although human cooperation has been argued to be fundamentally different from 
that of other animals (Silk, 2005), two key factors which relate to cooperation have 
recently been demonstrated in some situations in nonhuman primates, in particular 
capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella): pro-sociality (de Waal, Leimgruber, & Greenberg, 
2008; Lakshminarayanan & Santos, 2008; Warneken, Hare, Melis, Hanus, & Tomasello, 
2007; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006) and an aversion to inequity (Brosnan & de Waal, 
2003; Brosnan, Schiff, & de Waal, 2005; Fletcher, 2008; van Wolkenten, Brosnan, & de 
Waal, 2007).  First considering prosocial behavior, there is evidence that capuchin 
monkeys make decisions which bring rewards to their partners.  Notably, when given a 
choice between an option that rewards only themselves and an option which rewards both 
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them and a conspecific partner, capuchin monkeys make decisions which reward their 
partners, choosing options which brought food to their partners much more often when a 
partner was present than absent (Lakshminarayanan & Santos, 2008).  These monkeys are 
also sensitive to relationships, more often showing prosocial behavior towards kin and 
close social partners than to strangers (de Waal, et al., 2008).   
 This pattern of prosocial tendency is less consistent in other species.  In a series of 
studies which preceded those with capuchins, experiments involving three different 
groups of chimpanzees have failed to find evidence that chimpanzees are willing to 
choose options which bring food to their partners (Jensen, Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 
2006; Silk, et al., 2005).  In a follow-up study designed to investigate whether 
chimpanzees were distracted by the presence of a food reward for themselves, 
chimpanzees generally failed to bring rewards to their partners after they had already 
selected an (identical) reward for themselves (Vonk, et al., 2008).  Finally, chimpanzees 
failed to select the option which rewarded their partner even in a reciprocal situation, in 
which alternation of prosocial behavior would have benefited both individuals (Brosnan 
et al, 2009).  Callithrichids show a mixed response to the original paradigm, with 
marmosets choosing to bring food rewards to their partners (Burkart, Fehr, Efferson, & 
van Schaik, 2007), but not tamarins (Cronin, Schroeder, Rothwell, Silk, & Snowdon, 
2009). 
 However, it may be that the presence of food rewards overshadows any prosocial 
tendencies in chimpanzees, who do show helping behavior towards both human 
experimenters and conspecifics in situations which do not involve food rewards 
(Warneken, et al., 2007; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006).  Warneken and colleagues have 
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proposed that chimpanzees are more competitive in food situations, limiting prosocial 
behavior.  If so, this may be true in other species as well.  Aside from prosocial behavior, 
capuchins do show helping behavior (although they seem to be motivated more by food 
rewards; Barnes, Hill, Langer, Martinez, & Santos, 2008).  Thus, for the current study we 
include a non-food treatment, using tokens, to directly test this hypothesis. 
 Regarding the second social preference, inequity, evidence for a reaction to 
inequity has thus far been found in three different non-human species; capuchins, 
chimpanzees, and domestic dogs (Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; Brosnan, et al., 2005; 
Fletcher, 2008; Range, Horn, Viranyi, & Huber, 2008; van Wolkenten, et al., 2007).  In 
these studies, individuals respond negatively to receiving an outcome, which differs from 
that of their partners.  As with humans, the response is sensitive to external 
contingencies.  It is affected by the subjects’ social environment and relationships 
(Brosnan, Talbot, Ahlgren, Lambeth, & Schapiro, in press; Brosnan, Schiff & de Waal, 
2005), and the context of the interaction (e.g. the presence or absence of a task; Roma, 
Silberberg, Ruggiero, & Suomi, 2006; Dindo & de Waal, 2006; Dubreuil, Gentile, & 
Visalberghi, 2006).  Notably, the current task reflects conditions under which responses 
to inequity have been documented to occur. 
 Thus, some species, including capuchin monkeys and humans, show responses to 
both social preferences, raising the issue of how these seemingly incompatible social 
preferences interact.  How can an individual react against inequity in some situations, and 
yet choose to reward a partner in a situation in which the partner may receive better 
rewards in others?  Among the few studies investigating what occurs in situations with 
conflicting social motivations, the answer remains controversial (Englemann & Strobel, 
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2004; Fehr, Naef, & Schmidt, 2004). However, this answer is fundamental to our 
understanding of cooperation in society. In particular, some degree of inequity tolerance 
seems critical for the maintenance of cooperation, as it is rare that encounters between 
parties are always perfectly equitable.  
 Here we investigate the apparent co-existence of these two factors, the competing 
demands of prosociality and equity, in capuchin monkeys. Capuchin monkeys are a good 
model, as they show both robust inequity (Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; Fletcher, 2008; van 
Wolkenten, et al., 2007) and prosocial (de Waal, Dindo, Freeman, & Hall, 2005; 
Lakshminarayanan & Santos, 2008) responses, and are highly cooperative (de Waal & 
Berger, 2000). With regard to inequity, subjects refused to participate when receiving a 
lesser-value reward, both in a token-exchange task (Brosnan & de Waal, 2003, van 
Wolkenten et al, 2007) and in a barpull task, as was used in the current study (Brosnan, 
Freeman & de Waal, 2006).  With regard to prosocial behavior, in a two-choice task, 
subjects preferred the option which brought food rewards to both themselves and a 
partner, to the option which rewarded only themselves (de Waal, Dindo, Freeman, & 
Hall, 2005).   
For the current study we designed a task in which the monkeys had a single 
choice between a prosocial option (e.g. pulling in the tray) or no rewards for either 
monkey (e.g. refusing to pull).  From the earlier work, we knew that they have a 
preference for the prosocial option when rewards are equal, hence the goal of this 
investigation was to discover if they would maintain these prosocial preferences when 
rewards were unequal in favor of the partner.   
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We used a bar-pull apparatus that has been successfully used before in a variety of 
studies of cooperation (de Waal & Berger, 2000; de Waal & Davis, 2002; Melis, Hare, & 
Tomasello, 2006b; Brosnan, Freeman, & de Waal, 2006), but in the present case there 
was no opportunity for cooperation. Subjects could choose whether to pull in a tray with 
two food rewards, one for their partner and one for themselves (except in the conditions 
in which the subject received no reward).  If the tray was pulled in, both monkeys could 
access any rewards which were available, otherwise neither received any rewards. 
Rewards for the subject and the partner were either identical or different, favoring the 
partner. As a control for social interaction, a second, otherwise identical, set of treatments 
were run, but without a partner to receive the second reward (i.e. the subject was alone). 
Comparing pulling behavior with partner present vs. absent yielded data on prosocial 
preferences, because if subjects pull more often under the first condition they are 
probably more sensitive to the partner getting rewarded than the presence of rewards 
(Silk, et al., 2005; Jensen et al, 2006; Burkhart et al, 2007; Vonk et al, 2008; Cronin et al, 
2009). A second series was run to investigate the effects of available food on willingness 
to behave prosocially, to test the hypothesis that the presence of food may inhibit 
prosocial behavior (Warneken, et al., 2007). In this case, subjects pulled for tokens which 
were traded for the corresponding foods.  
Based on the previous published studies demonstrating that these capuchin 
monkeys have prosocial tendencies, we predicted that the monkeys would pull more 
often when the partner was present than absent when the rewards were equal (de Waal et 
al, 2005) or even unequal favoring the partner (Lakshminarayanan & Santos, 2008).  
However, based on published studies demonstrating that monkeys quit participating in 
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interactions when their partners receive better rewards than they do (Brosnan & de Waal, 
2003; van Wolkenten et al, 2007), we predicted that prosocial behavior would diminish 
as the discrepancy between the rewards increased.  Finally, based on Warneken and 
colleagues’ hypothesis (2007) that the presence of food decreases the likelihood of 
prosocial behavior, we hypothesized that prosocial behavior would be higher in the token 
than the food condition. 
 
Methods 
Subjects 
 The subjects were 10 brown capuchin monkeys from two social groups at the 
Yerkes National Primate Research Center, in Atlanta, Georgia, USA. The groups in 
which the subjects lived were housed in two large, indoor/outdoor enclosures. Each 
enclosure contained ample three-dimensional climbing space as well as trapezes, perches, 
and enrichment items. Purina small primate chow was provided twice a day, at 
approximately 9:30 hours and 17:30 hours. A tray consisting of fruits, vegetables, and 
bread with a protein solution was provided to each group every day at approximately 
17:30 hours. Running water was available ad libitum. This feeding schedule was 
followed regardless of the day’s testing, and subjects were never food or water deprived. 
For more details about the testing facility, see de Waal, 1997.  
 Subjects were tested in a testing chamber which was attached to their home 
enclosure. Within the chamber, subjects were separated by a clear plexiglass partition that 
allowed for visual and vocal contact, but did not allow either individual to access the 
other’s rewards.  This allowed us to interact with subjects in a controlled manner with 
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minimal distractions.  Subjects were accustomed to the testing chamber and the 
procedure used to select subjects, as these procedures have been used daily for more than 
a decade.  No subject was ever involved in more than one barpull test on any given day, 
and test sessions were always performed between 10:00 and 13:00.  Testing was 
performed 5 days a week, and subjects were tested regularly, without gaps, throughout 
the duration of the study.   
Unrelated individuals from the same group were paired for testing. Pairs consisted 
of two females of similar age and rank; rank order was determined using data from 
weekly behavioral observations.  These five pairs remained the same for the duration of 
the study. All subjects had used the barpull apparatus in previous studies, but the most 
recent was completed approximately 3 years prior to the current study (Brosnan et al, 
2006). 
Barpull paradigm 
 Our barpull was designed after Crawford’s, developed for use with chimpanzees 
(Crawford, 1937), and this and similar designs have been used extensively to study 
cooperation (de Waal & Berger, 2000; de Waal & Davis, 2002), inequity (Brosnan, et al., 
2006), and prosocial preferences (Lakshminarayanan & Santos, 2008) in capuchin 
monkeys.  The barpull consisted of a tray with a handle which could be used to pull the 
tray within reach of the monkeys; the barpull apparatus was not counterweighted or 
otherwise restricted, so pulling the bar to retrieve a reward required very little effort on 
the part of the individual.  Rewards were placed in transparent cups to keep them from 
sliding off of the tray.  Food cups were placed directly in front of each monkey.  If the 
monkeys pulled the tray in all of the way, the tray latched into position adjacent to the 
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subjects, and subjects could pull as many times as they wished.  For this test, the barpull 
was placed directly against the test chamber.   
Rewards 
 Rewards for this test consisted of cucumber slices and grapes.  A “lower value” 
reward was a quarter of a cucumber slice while a “higher value” reward was a single 
seedless grape.  These rewards were chosen because both are favored by the capuchins 
(hence they are motivated to participate in the test) but there was a strong preference by 
all subjects for a grape over cucumber slices. 
 To determine reward preferences, a dichotomous food preference test was done in 
the presence of the individuals they were paired with for the remainder of the study.  
Subjects were offered each food for 10 consecutive trials, with the location of foods 
alternating from side to side, to control for side biases.  A food was considered preferred 
by the individual if they chose it in a minimum of 8 out of 10 trials (Brosnan & de Waal, 
2004a, 2004b), although in practice, each subject showed a 100% preference for a grape 
over the cucumber piece.  These results are consistent across time for individuals.  
Apparatus Habituation 
Following the reward preference tests, each monkey was habituated to the barpull 
apparatus before formal testing began.  Habituation was done with the same social 
partner with which they were paired for the entire experiment.  Since individuals were 
familiar with the barpull from previous studies (e.g., Brosnan et al, 2006), only a single 
session was used to re-familiarize subjects with the apparatus.  During this session, food 
was placed in both cups and replenished as needed, and in all trials both cups were baited 
equally.  For the first 5 minutes of habituation, there was no divider in the test chamber, 
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and both monkeys had unlimited access to the barpull apparatus and the rewards from 
both cups.  In the second half of the session, the monkeys were separated from one 
another using the plexiglass divider, so only one was able to manipulate the barpull at a 
time; both monkeys had the opportunity to be alone on the handle side of the apparatus 
and were allowed either 10 pulls or 5 minutes, whichever came first.  Apples, known to 
be intermediate in preference between cucumbers and grapes, were used as rewards 
during the habituation sessions. 
Testing conditions 
Food Treatment  
In the Food Treatment, the barpull apparatus was baited in four different ways.   
Each session consisted of 20 trials, with four trials of each type presented in a 
randomized order within the test session.  Each test subject completed 2 sessions with a 
partner (Partner sessions) followed by 2 sessions without a partner (Control sessions).  
Control sessions were necessary to verify that any responses were due to the presence of 
the partner and did not occur based on some other aspect of the methodology. 
The four conditions were as follows.  The “Equal Low” was a control condition 
which tested subjects’ responses when they received the same low-value reward as a 
partner, a cucumber piece.  The “Equal High” condition was the same, except both 
subjects received a grape. Part of the reason for including this condition was to maintain 
subject motivation, and to acquire a baseline pull rate for highly-preferred foods. The 
“Unequal” condition tested the subject’s response when the partner got a better reward, a 
grape, than the subject, who received a piece of cucumber. Finally, the “None” condition 
tested the subject’s willingness to pull when they received no reward, but their partner 
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received either a grape or a cucumber slice.  Subjects who pull in this condition, either 1) 
do not understand the contingencies of the methodology (tested with the Control 
sessions), 2) are accustomed to pulling, based on long experience with the apparatus (also 
tested with the Control sessions), or 3) are being altruistic. Note there were half as many 
sessions of none/low and none/high as the others, in order to avoid loss of subject 
motivation.   
Within trials, the subject had 15 seconds in which to pull the bar and retrieve the 
reward, upon which both monkeys had an additional 30 seconds to consume their food 
before the commencement of the next trial.  If the subject failed to pull the bar within the 
15 second window, the food was removed from the cups and there was still a 30 second 
delay before the next trial began.  This delay was maintained to avoid the possibility of 
subjects choosing not to pull because the time delay was shorter. 
 
Token Treatment 
It has previously been hypothesized that some primates, in particular 
chimpanzees, respond differently to prosocial situations when food is involved 
(Warneken, Chen, & Tomasello, 2006).  Thus, for the Token Treatment, subjects were 
given the same series of tests, except instead of pulling for foods, they pulled for tokens 
which represented foods.  Capuchin monkeys are known to form strong associations 
between tokens and their corresponding food rewards (Addessi, Crescimbene, & 
Visalberghi, 2007; Addessi, Mancini, Crescimbene, Padoa-Schioppa, & Visalberghi, 
2008; Brosnan & de Waal, 2004a, 2004b).  Thus, in the Token Treatment, the cups were 
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baited with tokens representing the same food reward combinations tested in the Food 
Treatment, with bolts representing cucumbers and washers representing grapes.   
Prior to the commencement of the Token Treatment testing, subjects were 
conditioned through association that one token (a metal bolt) was worth a piece of 
cucumber and the other (a large metal washer) was worth a grape.  This was done in two 
50-trial sessions.  Following a previous study which conditioned tokens to different 
rewards (Brosnan & de Waal, 2004a), in each session, the individuals were paired in the 
test chamber with their testing partner and separated by the plexiglass divider.  Five of 
each token (washers and bolts) were dropped into the chamber and the individual was 
able return/ exchange the tokens in any order they chose, and received the corresponding 
reward.  After Individual 1 returned all 10 tokens, their partner completed 10 such trials, 
and the two continued this process until each monkey had exchanged 50 times (25 times 
per token).  These test sessions were performed on two consecutive days.  In previous 
studies, this number of exchanges or fewer, either personally experienced or observed, 
resulted in strong preferences for the token worth the higher-value of the two food items 
(Brosnan & de Waal, 2004a; 2004b). 
During testing, tokens were presented in the same manner as the food rewards in 
the Food Treatment; once the bar was fully pulled in, an experimenter simultaneously 
replaced the tokens with the appropriate reward(s).  As in the Food Treatment, each 
session consisted of 20 trials, with four of each type presented in a randomized order 
within the test session.  Each test subject completed 2 sessions with a partner (Partner 
sessions) followed by 2 sessions without a partner (Control sessions).   
Testing Order 
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All individuals completed both treatments.  Pairs completed all sessions within 
one treatment before beginning the next.  The order in which they completed the 
treatments was counterbalanced (i.e. half of the pairs were randomly assigned to begin 
with the Food Treatment and the other half began with the Token Treatment).  There was 
no break in testing between treatments, with the exception of token training for those 
pairs completing the Token Treatment after the Food Treatment (all individuals 
completed token training immediately prior to the Token Treatment to assure that the 
associations were fresh during the experiment).   
Pairs remained consistent throughout testing.  Each individual within a pair 
participated in eight test sessions per treatment.  These sessions were comprised of four 
test sessions in the “partner” role and four test sessions in the “subject” role.  The order of 
sessions for a pair was randomized within a treatment such that either subject could be in 
either role on any given session.  Roles never varied within a session.  Complete testing 
of one pair consisted of 8 sessions per condition, or 16 test sessions total, in addition to 
token training.  Treatments consisted of high/high, low/low, low/high, and none/reward.  
None/reward was divided in to four sessions of none/low and four sessions of none/high. 
As noted above, this was done to avoid extinction of pulling behavior if the subjects 
found the none/reward condition frustrating. The difference in sample size is accounted 
for in our analysis. 
All tests were videotapes using a Canon mini-DV recorder.  All video tapes were 
later coded on multiple passes by a human observer who was blind to the hypotheses.  All 
analyses are based on the coded data.  
Statistics 
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 Statistical analyses were accomplished using randomization methods to compute 
exact sampling distributions for paired-sample Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks test statistics, 
treating each monkey as a single observation.  Based on previously published research, 
we had specific predictions that subjects would bring food rewards to their partners (e.g., 
behave prosocially; de Waal, et al., 2008; Lakshminarayanan & Santos, 2008) and would 
dislike conditions in which the partner received a better reward than the subject (e.g. an 
aversion to inequity; Fletcher, 2008; Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; van Wolkenten, et al., 
2007; see Introduction for more details).  Thus all statistics related to these predictions 
are one-tailed tests, a procedure also followed in related previous studies (e.g. 
Lakshminarayanan & Santos, 2008). As none of our other predictions were directional, 
all other tests are two-tailed.  All of our comparisons were planned comparisons based on 
the specific hypotheses we were testing.  Nonetheless, given that four tests were 
necessary to compare the partner to control conditions, an adjusted p-value is appropriate 
(bonferroni correction; p = 0.013).  
 To analyze pulls, we calculated the mean pull rate for each condition and 
treatment separately, pooled across all individuals.  We had a few instances of pulls 
which appeared to be outliers, occurring at the end of a trial or as the experimenter re-
appeared.  Thus, we chose to set a cutoff point to avoid the possibility that these pulls 
were due to some other feature (e.g. demand characteristics of the experimenter).  The 
mean latency for partner tests was 2.26 seconds (SE = 2.07 seconds) and the mean 
latency for the solo tests was 2.31 seconds (SE = 2.28 seconds). We set the cut-off at 15 
seconds. 
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Results 
Food Preference Tests 
 Each individual used in this test showed a 100% preference (10 out of 10 choices) 
for the single grape over the cucumber slice in a dichotomous choice. 
Food Treatment 
 Overall, subjects showed significant variation between conditions, both for the 
partner conditions (Friedman’s test, |Z|>3.291, df=4, p < 0.001) as well as the solo 
control conditions (Friedman’s test, |Z|>3.291, df=4, p < 0.001). 
 Purely selfish subjects should decide to pull based only on their own reward and 
should not vary their decision with the presence or absence of another monkey. Indeed, as 
expected, subjects pulled nearly all of the time when they received the high-value grapes 
(high/high) both when the partner was present and absent (means of 100.0% and 98.8%, 
respectively).  
 On the other hand, with a less desirable reward (e.g., when there is no ceiling 
effect based on reward value) prosocial subjects should choose to pull more often when 
there is a partner present than when there is no other monkey to receive the reward 
(Figure 1).  We do find a trend towards subjects in this condition pulling more often 
when their partner was present than absent (low/low: Z=1.534, N=10, p=0.0625, one-
tailed).  This finding accords with previous research (de Waal et al, 2008; 
Lakshminarayanan & Santos, 2008), both in direction and magnitude (a 15-20% 
increase). 
 In all other conditions, there was an inequity present such that the partner received 
a higher reward than the subject (puller).  Nonetheless, in the one case in which the 
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partner received the lower-value cucumber, the subjects continued to behave prosocially, 
pulling more often when the partner was present than absent (none/low: Z = 1.761, N = 
10, p = 0.0391, one-tailed).  However, when the partner received a grape, the puller 
subject did not behave prosocially, regardless whether they received a lower-value 
cucumber or no reward (low/high: Z=0.675, N=10, p=0.25, one-tailed; none/high, Z = 
0.626, N = 10, p = 0.2657, one-tailed). These results indicate that prosocial behavior may 
be more dependent on the partner’s outcome (e.g. low- or high-value food) than the 
subject’s outcome (e.g. low-value or no reward).   
Another possibility is that subjects’ pulling behavior is based on the relative 
difference in value between their reward and those of their partners.  We have two 
conditions in which it is possible to investigate this.  We can compare the none/low 
condition to the none/high condition, as the subject’s outcome remains the same (no 
reward) and there is inequity in both cases (e.g. the partner always receives a better 
outcome than the subject).  We find that when the subject receives nothing, she is 
nonetheless more likely to pull if the partner received cucumber than grape (Z = 1.717, N 
= 10, p = 0.043, one-tailed).  Moreover, when the subject gets a low value reward, there 
is no difference in pulling rate between the conditions in which the partner receives a 
cucumber (e.g. equity) versus a more desirable grape (e.g. inequity; comparing the 
partner condition for low/low and low/high; Z = 0.579, N = 10, p = 0.2813, one-tailed).  
Thus, it is clear that inequity alone is not sufficient to curtail prosocial behavior, nor is 
the situation in which the puller receives no reward.    
 We further investigated subjects’ feeding behavior, to provide evidence on 
whether their acceptance of rewards was affected by the distribution of rewards.  We find 
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only an effect of social facilitation (increased eating when group members are eating; 
James, 1953).  Subjects were overall more likely to consume the food reward when a 
partner was present than absent (exact Wilcoxon test, Z = 1.761, N = 10, p = 0.039, one-
tailed). 
 Finally, we investigated the latency to pull across conditions.  We find no 
significant difference between the partner absent (solo control) and partner present 
conditions (exact Wilcoxon test, Z = 0.787, N = 10, p = 0.216, one-tailed).  However, 
there is variation between the conditions within both the partner and control treatments 
(Friedmans’ test: p = 0.017 for control condition, p = 0.004 for partner condition).  
Examining conditions individually, in the none/high subjects pulled more rapidly in the 
partner condition than in the solo condition. 
Token Treatment 
 As for the food condition, in the token conditions one’s own reward should be the 
exclusive modulator of behavior for selfish subjects, with the presence or absence of a 
partner playing no role in decisions. Indeed, as with the food reward, subjects pulled 
essentially all of the time when they received the high-value grapes (high/high) both 
when the partner was present and absent (with frequencies 97.2% and 95.8%, 
respectively). However, unlike the food condition, overall pull rates across all other 
conditions were insensitive to the presence of a partner (Figure 3). In no condition did 
subjects change their pulling rates between partner present and absent conditions 
(none/low, Z = 0.177, N = 9, p = 0.4297, one-tailed; none/high, Z = 0.851, N = 9, p = 
0.1973, one-tailed; low/low: Z=0.524, N=9, p=0.30, one-tailed; low/high: Z=0, N=9, 
p=0.50).  Finally, unlike in the Food Treatment, when the subject received no reward she 
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was just as likely to pull when the partner received cucumber (none/low) as when she 
received grape (none/high; exact Wilcoxon test, Z = 1.150, N = 9, p = 0.125, one-tailed). 
 We find no difference in food consumption behavior dependent upon whether the 
partner is present or absent.  (exact Wilcoxon test, Z = 1.447, N = 9, p = 0.074, one-
tailed). Latency to exchange also does not differ between the solo (control) and partner 
conditions (exact Wilcoxon test, Z = 1.270, N = 9, p = 0.102, one-tailed), nor is there 
variation between the conditions (Friedmans’ test: p = 0.19 for control condition, p = 0.21 
for partner condition).   
 
Discussion 
 
 We replicate previous findings of prosocial behavior among capuchin monkeys, 
and moreover demonstrate that prosocial behavior is not always curtailed as a result of 
the partner receiving a better reward.  Subjects behaved prosocially, choosing to access 
rewards more often when a partner was present than absent, when subjects got the same 
rewards (low/low), although we found evidence of a ceiling effect when both subjects 
received grapes (high/high).  Moreover, subjects continued to behave prosocially in the 
other condition in which their partner received a low-value reward (none/low), even 
though the subject themselves received nothing. This latter result indicates that neither 
receiving nothing nor inequity between the self and the partner were sufficient to override 
prosocial behavior.  However, prosocial behavior was not seen when the partner received 
a high value reward and the subject received a less desirable, or no, reward.  Thus, 
subjects may be basing their decision about whether to be prosocial on an interaction 
between value of the partner’s reward and the relative difference between the two 
rewards.  These results indicate that prosocial behavior is substantially mitigated when 
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the partner’s reward is too great, or the difference between the rewards given to the 
partner and subject becomes too extreme.   
 There are several other possible explanations for these results that can be ruled 
out.  First, the subjects pull quite often, even in the inequitable conditions.  This is likely 
explained by the fact that these subjects have used the barpull apparatus for years, and are 
likely inclined to pull when given the opportunity.  However note that despite high levels, 
subjects’ pulling does vary based on condition, showing that their behavior is affected by 
the differences in payoffs and partner presence.  Second, the prosocial behavior cannot be 
explained by a tendency to pull more often in the presence of the partner (e.g. increased 
arousal) since subjects failed to pull more often in some partner conditions (e.g. low/high 
and non/high), but not others.  This variability is not expected if arousal is causing the 
increases in prosocial pulling.  Similarly, prosocial behavior is unlikely to be explained 
by stimulus enhancement (e.g. learning to pull in the presence of a grape or learning to 
pull in the presence of a partner) because, again, pulling behavior was not consistent 
across conditions or partner present vs absent.  Finally, it is possible that the subjects’ 
high level of pulling in the unequal conditions is due to a misunderstanding of the task 
(e.g. confusion or an expectation that they could receive the higher reward).  Two pieces 
of evidence argue against this possibility.  First, subjects had multiple test sessions, and 
in no session were they able to get the better reward, so they should have learned the task 
contingencies.  Second, despite high levels of pulling, their behavior varies between 
conditions as if they understand that they cannot obtain the higher reward. Considering 
only the grape conditions, the fact that they pull all the time when they get a grape 
(high/high) and much less often when the partner only gets the grape (either low/high or 
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none/high) again indicates that, despite being attracted to the grape, they are able to 
adjust their behavior according to the condition.  
Although additional research is needed to quantify the degree of inequity which is 
‘too much,’ the fact that equity is not a requirement for prosocial behavior makes the 
evolution of such behavior more likely, as there are probably few situations in which 
equity is always possible (e.g. Aghion et al, 1999).  This supports the development of 
cooperation, as the costs of occasional inequity may be outweighed by the benefits gained 
from prosociality.  Thus, individuals who are willing to accept some inequity on some 
occasions will ultimately reap more benefits than those who do not.  On the other hand, if 
inequity is extreme, individuals may do better to cease interacting and find a new partner 
elsewhere.  In these cases, the cost of inequity outweighs the benefits of sociality, and 
prosocial behavior disappears.    
 It initially seems counter-intuitive that monkeys who are averse to inequity can 
simultaneously favor an outcome which could reward a partner with an even better 
outcome.  These results indicate that this paradox is resolved by the fact that the monkeys 
are willing to tolerate low levels of inequity in order to behave prosocially.  This may 
also explain seemingly contradictory results in previous studies, in which capuchins 
varied in their willingness to behave prosocially if their partner received a better reward 
(de Waal, et al., 2008; Lakshminarayanan & Santos, 2008).  These studies used different 
food rewards, thus the difference in response might be a function differences between 
values of the items. 
 This willingness to behave prosocially even when another benefits more than self 
may also allow individuals to occasionally accept inferior rewards in a mutualistic 
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cooperation situation.  In a previous study, capuchin monkeys needed to cooperate to 
obtain food rewards.  If successful, both received rewards, however sometimes those 
rewards varied in value.  The key was that the monkeys were not separated by the 
experimenters, and thus had to choose for themselves the reward for which they were 
willing to work.  In this way, subjects could accept an ‘offer’ to cooperate for a low or 
high value food item.  Capuchins were equally likely to be successful in the cooperative 
task regardless of whether rewards were equal or unequal, however they were much more 
likely to cooperate if the partners split the unequal payoffs such that each monkey 
received the better reward approximately half of the time (Brosnan, et al., 2006).  Thus, 
this behavior was self-serving; monkeys who did not show some willingness to benefit 
their partner ended up with far fewer rewards overall, due to the fact that their partner 
ceased cooperating.  This supports findings of the current study, indicating that there may 
be long-term benefits to assisting others, even when these others get more.  However, 
note that the behaviors seen in these two studies are not the same.  In the current 
experiment, there was no opportunity for reciprocity within a test session (e.g., the 
partner did not need to help the subject to obtain the rewards) yet subjects nonetheless 
chose to bring better rewards to their partners.  
 Interestingly, capuchin monkeys showed no differences between conditions in the 
token session, in which subjects pulled for tokens which could be exchanged for food.  
This condition was included as it has been argued that chimpanzees, at least, behave 
differently in the presence of food (Warneken, et al., 2007), and capuchins do treat tokens 
similarly to their corresponding food items (Addessi, et al., 2007; Addessi, et al., 2008; 
Brosnan & de Waal, 2004a, 2004b).  However, there were no significant differences 
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between conditions when tokens were used rather than foods.  There are several potential 
explanations for this.  First, it is possible that this hypothesis holds for chimpanzees, but 
not capuchin monkeys.  Like chimpanzees, capuchins do help (Barnes et al, 2008), 
however capuchins seem more food motivated in these studies, and also behave 
prosocially in other food-related contexts (de Waal et al, 2008; Lakshminarayanan & 
Santos, 2008).  Second, token rewards may lack the emotional salience often if they are 
connected to pro-social or inequity-based decisions (Xiao & Houser, 2005). A lack of 
emotional salience could occur, for example, if subjects did not form strong associations 
between tokens and food rewards.  Although the monkeys understood the connection 
between the tokens and the food rewards, these tokens are still likely to be less salient 
than the actual grape or cucumber (preferences for tokens are typically weaker than those 
for the corresponding foods; Brosnan & de Waal, 2004a, 2005).  Third, although the 
number of trials and sessions for conditioning were chosen because they were known to 
elicit significant token-reward associations in this population of capuchin monkeys 
(Brosnan & de Waal, 2004a; 2004b), we did not run a separate preference test to verify 
the strength of the association.  Thus it is possible that for whatever reason, the monkeys 
failed to make the association in the current study. 
 One issue which remains to be addressed is the differences which we see between 
the different non-human primate species.  This study addresses capuchin monkeys, which 
are a new world primate with many convergences with humans (cooperation, large brain-
to-body ratio), but which are not as closely phylogenetically related to humans as the 
apes.  The species most commonly used for such comparisons, chimpanzees (and their 
sister species, bonobos) show more variation in both prosocial behavior and inequity 
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responses (see Introduction for details). Thus, what this study can tell us about human 
evolution remains an open question.   
Of course, one possibility is that this ability arose independently in humans and 
capuchin monkeys, but not in other species.  However, given that other species, such as 
chimpanzees, are also sensitive to partners’ behaviors (Melis, Hare, & Tomasello, 2006a; 
Melis, et al., 2006b) and inequity (Brosnan, et al., 2005), this seems unlikely.  Another 
possibility is that chimpanzees, too, will show some ability to integrate these behaviors, 
but that other characteristics are standing in the way, for instance, constrained behavior in 
the presence of food (Warneken, et al., 2007).  It may also be that chimpanzees are more 
able to respond with nuance to inequity, responding in some social situations, but not 
others (Brosnan, et al., 2005).  Supporting this, chimpanzees are much better at 
cooperative tasks when interacting with tolerant social partners (Melis, et al., 2006b), and 
actively recruit those collaborators which best suit their needs (Melis, et al., 2006a).  
Additional studies on different species, including both chimpanzees and other, less well 
studied primates, may help to elucidate the presence of homologies or homoplasies in 
these social behaviors. 
 We find that capuchin monkeys hold multiple social preferences simultaneously.  
This may have aided in the evolution of cooperation and other social behaviors which 
require individuals to guard against being cheated while at the same time behaving in 
such a way that productive social partners desire to continue interactions. These results 
indicate that social preferences such as an aversion to inequity and a preference for 
prosociality may have simultaneously co-evolved in the primate lineage. It would be 
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valuable in future research to further clarify how these preferences interact to determine 
decisions in social environments. 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1: Pull percentages in food condition by treatment. The x-axis indicates the pulling 
condition, black bars indicate the control, when no partner was present, and white bars 
indicate response when a partner was present.  Overall, subjects were more likely to pull 
when a partner was present than absent. 
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Figure 2: Food consumption by the subject conditional on pulling for the three conditions 
(high/high), (low/low), (low/high) in the food condition. Food consumption data do not 
exist for (none/low) and (none/high), because no food was available for consumption in 
these conditions. 
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Figure 3: Pull percentage for token condition by treatment.  Subjects did not show any 
consistent pattern when pulling for tokens associated with food. 
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Figure 4: Food consumption by the subject conditional on pulling for the three conditions 
(2,2), (1,1), (1,2) in the token condition. Food consumption data do not exist for (0,1) and 
(0,2), because no food was available for consumption in these conditions. 
 
 
